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ARE LISTED FIRMS BETTER GOVERNED? EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE ON BOARD STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Cesario Mateus*, Thomas Hall**, Irina B. Mateus* 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the relationship among board characteristics (network centrality, leadership structure, 
outsider participation, portion of male directors, director age, and presence of financial experts) and 
firm-level financial performance (cash holdings, leverage, ROA, risk, and risk-adjusted return).  Our 
data encompass firms from eight countries during 2003-2012.  Unlisted firms are smaller and have 
less leverage.  Despite the fact that unlisted firms have prima facie better average governance (they 
are less likely to have an executive chair (or CEO as chair of the board) and a higher average portion 
of outside directors), they exhibit worse risk-adjusted returns.  Higher levels of director connectedness 
(centrality) are generally associated with more observable entrenchment (more cash, less leverage), 
whereas other board characteristics do not show clear relationships with entrenchment.  Our findings 
are consistent with the view that firmly established CEOs are willing and able to pack the board with 
qualified and connected members, who nevertheless do not act to constrain CEO entrenchment.  This 
is true for both listed and unlisted firms. 
 
Keyword: Directors, Network Centrality, Liquidity, Capital Structure, Firm Performance 
 
* University of Greenwich – Faculty of Business, London, United Kingdom 
** Christopher Newport University, Newport News, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we critically examine the long-held view 
that managers of firms with dispersed ownership (vis-
à-vis privately held firms) are less effective at 
monitoring and controlling CEO entrenchment.1 Our 
central research question is whether listing status 
(broad market, narrow market, unlisted) affects the 
relationship between board characteristics and firm 
performance. In general, listing status is associated 
with the degree of ownership dispersion, such that 
firms listed on large public stock exchanges, even 
though they may have blockholders, often face larger 
agency costs vis-à-vis privately held firms that have 
little ownership dispersion. In this view, the 
governance structure of privately held firms2 would be 
                                                        
1 Indeed, incentive realignment has been found to be a major 
motivation for UK firms that convert from public to private 
status (Wright, Timmons, and Renneboog, 2006). 2 Although publicly traded firms face conflicts between 
dispersed owners and managers, privately held firms face 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, 
which can lead to tunneling. This is not a key aspect of the 
present study, however, because presumably shareholders 
who control a CEO could also control a board. This means 
the presence of outside board members, split CEO/chair 
leadership structure, etc. should not be relevant for (by 
definition) “controlling” shareholders. 
expected to have a lower impact on performance than 
in publicly traded companies (Ferreira, et al 2013). 
We measure board structure along several 
dimensions: network centrality of the directors, 
executive role of the board’s char (including dual 
CEO/chair status), portion of outside directors, age, 
and portion male. Our measures of firm performance 
are somewhat limited compared to typical studies of 
publicly traded companies because by definition 
unlisted firms have less transparent share prices; we 
focus on cash/total assets, capital structure (long-term 
debt/total assets), risk (standard deviation of ROA) 
and risk-adjusted return (measured as the coefficient 
of variation, or ROA standard deviation. Our data 
encompass firms from eight countries (Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom) during 2003-2012.  
We find that unlisted firms are smaller and have 
less leverage. Despite the fact that unlisted firms have 
prima facie better average governance (they are less 
likely to have an executive chair (or CEO as chair of 
the board) and a higher average portion of outside 
directors), they exhibit worse risk-adjusted returns. 
Higher levels of director connectedness (centrality) 
are generally associated with more observable 
entrenchment (more cash, less leverage), whereas 
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other board characteristics do not show clear 
relationships with entrenchment. Our findings are 
consistent with the view that firmly established CEOs 
are willing and able to pack the board with qualified 
and connected members, who nevertheless do not act 
to constrain CEO entrenchment. This is true for both 
listed and unlisted firms. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
provides an abridged overview of the vast literature 
on the relationship between firm performance board 
characteristics, and clearly enumerates the central 
hypothesis of our study. Section 3 presents 
information on the two data sets we employ (BoardEx 
for information on board characteristics; Orbis for 
information on firm performance). The models and 
procedures used to construct variables are covered 
next. Section 4 presents results, with section 5 
devoted to robustness tests. The conclusion is 
presented in section 6. 
 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Literature 
 
There is an extensive literature on the corporate 
governance of publicly traded firms, but information 
on corporate governance of privately held companies 
is much less substantial. Classical finance theory 
argues that entrenched managers can extract value 
from dispersed shareholders of publicly traded firms, 
and more recent analysis of this argument (Bebchuck, 
et al 2002) is known as the “managerial power” 
approach. In terms of the present study, because of 
coordination problems among dispersed shareholders, 
CEOs of publicly traded firms are more likely to be 
unconstrained by owners vis-à-vis privately held 
firms. So, listing status3 (as a proxy for shareholder 
dispersion) should affect how board characteristics 
affect financial performance. Of course, even publicly 
traded firms can be dominated by blockholders (and 
by the role of the press, as in Kuhnen and Niessen 
2012), but that can lead to problems whereby 
dominant shareholders divert earnings from minority 
shareholders. Because the latter is more likely in 
privately held firms, the research to date is ambiguous 
in terms of how (or whether) ownership structure is 
related to performance. For this reason, our study 
addresses a significant gap in understanding of the 
relationship between performance and governance of 
privately held vis-à-vis publicly traded firms. 
Specifically, we address the issue of how board 
characteristics (network centrality, age, gender, chair 
executive role or even CEO) relate to performance. 
                                                        
3 The importance of cross listing in allowing a firm to “choose” 
its corporate governance regime is explored by Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2008. 
Several recent papers (e.g., Brown, et al 2010; 
Liu 2010; Renneboog and Zhao 2011; Fracassi and 
Tate 2012; Faleye 2012) have examined the 
importance of network centrality of either boards of 
directors or CEOs, but they tend to focus on publicly 
traded companies. Alonso and Aperto (2011) find that 
more outsiders on the board increase the chance that 
CEO pay is linked to equity value; Han and Yang 
(2013) present a model that examines the implications 
of social network communication on welfare, cost of 
capital, liquidity, and trading volume. In general, 
network centrality seems to confer advantages on 
those who possess higher levels of it, although for 
board of directors, the evidence is somewhat 
ambiguous. On the one hand, there seems to be 
evidence that interlocking board membership allows 
the proliferation of bad habits such as option 
backdating (Bizjak, et al 2007). Directors that serve 
on multiple boards seem to be less able to monitor and 
effectively curtail CEO entrenchment (Fich and 
Shivdasani 2006). In terms of specific competence of 
board members, Minton et al 2011 find that, for 
commercial banks in the United States, financial 
expertise of board members has a negative impact on 
performance. On the other hand, Larcker, et al (2012), 
find that firms with well-connected directors earn 
superior risk-adjusted returns vis-à-vis other firms. 
Horton, et al (2009) find that network centrality of 
board members improves performance of their firm. 
The fact that “friendly” boards have both costs and 
benefits is explored by Schmidt (2008). 
One advantage of comparing listed to unlisted 
firms is that we can obtain unique insight on a 
complex feature of the interaction of boards with 
performance—complementarity among how different 
mechanisms may have varying impacts in different 
national contexts (Goergen 2007). A study by de 
Jong, et al (2002) finds that governance mechanisms 
are different in different countries, so that where the 
market for corporate control (take-overs) is robust, 
board characteristics are not as important in mitigating 
entrenchment (a related study was undertaken by 
Dimopoulos and Wagner 2010). Because we have 
information on companies located in eight European 
countries, we can present some insight on whether any 
of the public/private distinctions in board effects on 
performance are relevant in different institutional 
contexts (Martynova and Renneboog 2011).  The 
difference between private and public firm investment 
indicates that there may be substantial differences in 
governance between the two types of companies 
(Gilje and Taillard 2013). Because of a high level of 
cross-sectional variation in Germany and the UK 
(Goergen 1997), it makes sense to include these two 
countries in our study; we also include a number of 
other countries which had a good overlap between the 
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Orbis and BoardEx information we used to construct 
our data. 
A number of recent papers have considered how 
board strength interacts with performance. Strong 
CEOs can pack the board with lightweight members 
(“cheerleaders”) that will not monitor management 
effectively (Fracassi and Tate 2012; Cohen, et al 
2012; Nguyen,2012). On the other hand, a high level 
of entrenchment-induced job security might mean that 
the CEO feels confident enough to allow strong 
boards to be assembled (Cornelli, et al 2010). Board 
size had an impact on performance during the Great 
Depression (Graham, et al 2011). Board competence 
has also been addressed via network centrality, level 
of experience (Kang 2013), and industry experience 
(Faleye, et al 2013); the positive and negative aspects 
of advising vs. monitoring by boards is discussed in 
Schmidt (2008); the possibility that strong boards 
could lead to worse corporate performance is explored 
by Bach and Metzger (2013). 
The role of gender in decision-making and 
boardroom dynamics has been the subject of several 
recent papers as well. Recent experimental evidence 
(Hoogendoorn, et al 2013) shows that the gender 
composition of business teams affects performance. 
Specifically, Ferreira (2009) surveys research related 
to gender diversity on boards of directors. Adams and 
Funk (2011) find evidence that female board members 
have more tolerance for risk, which could affect firm-
level risk-taking. The recent change in Norweigian 
law mandating that 40% of board members be female 
allowed examination of the effects of such laws 
(Ahern and Dittmar 2012; Matsa and Miller 2010). In 
this unusual situation, the newly hired directors were 
on average younger and had less experience. But even 
in more normal circumstances, it makes sense to 
control for age and specific expertise (e.g., previous 
service as a financial director or CFO) as well when 
examining gender of board directors.   
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
 
Our central research question is whether listing status 
(large index, other index, unlisted) in different 
countries affects the relationship between board 
characteristics (network centrality, portion of outside 
directors, average age, portion male, and presence of 
financial experts) and firm performance (measured by 
cash/assets, leverage, standard deviation of ROA, and 
coefficient of ROA variation). If managerial incentive 
alignment for unlisted firms is of higher quality due to 
more ownership concentration, we might find that the 
composition and characteristics of the board of 
directors should have no relationship (or, a lesser 
relationship vis-à-vis publicly listed firms) to 
performance. But what types of relationships should 
we expect in listed companies? 
There are some ambiguities regarding how 
entrenchment could affect board characteristics. 
Entrenchment should be associated with a number of 
observable financial outcomes, however. For 
example, CEOs with little board oversight could be 
tempted to build up more cash reserves vis-à-vis rivals 
that exhibit more effective corporate governance 
(Schauten, et al 2008). Similarly, due to the fact that 
debt functions as a disciplining4 device, we might 
expect leverage to be lower in entrenched firms.  
Presumably, risk (here, measured as the standard 
deviation of ROA) should be lower for entrenched 
firms for the same reasons, although this may not be 
as straightforward as for leverage due to some 
complexities concerning unlisted vis-à-vis listed 
firms. Because publicly traded firm ownership can be 
easily diversified, shareholders might be more willing 
to see risk-taking in such settings. But because 
privately held firms tend to concentrate ownership, we 
might expect to see lower risk tolerance on the part of 
such investors (they might be less diversified, 
especially if the firm is family-owned). Finally, we 
might expect that one measure of returns adjusted for 
risk, the coefficient of variation (defined as the 
standard deviation of ROA over the mean value of 
ROA) should be lower (meaning, a better investment) 
for privately held firms for the simple reason that 
there may be some discount on prices for illiquid 
shares of unlisted companies, reflected in a higher 
average return for unit of risk. 
 
3. Data and Models 
 
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our paper operationalizes three separate issues: board 
characteristics, firm performance, and listing status. 
Board characteristics are primarily measured by (1) 
whether the chair has a day-to-day role in managing 
the company (i.e., either as an executive chair or as 
CEO), (2) the portion of outside (non-executive) 
members on the board, (3) network centrality defined 
as the average level of connectedness of the board, (4) 
the portion of male directors, (5) director age, and (6) 
whether any director has experience as a financial 
director or CFO. Centrality is operationalized by 
taking the mean level of the BoardEx variable 
“Number of Connections” for each firm-year (Liu, 
2010, provides information on how this variable is 
constructed: “BoardEx consolidates information 
concerning the board of directors and senior 
                                                        
4 For an examination of disciplining devices in Europe, see 
Koke, Dherment-Ferere, and Renneboog, 2001. 
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management of publicly quoted and large private 
companies from various public-domain sources. For 
each individual covered, BoardEx provides his 
employment history, educational background, and 
other activities such as club membership. Personal 
biographical information in BoardEx dates back to as 
early as 1926.”). For the final variable, we have data 
on the number of directors who have experience either 
as a CFO or as a financial director—we convert this to 
a dummy variable taking the value of “1” for any 
firm-year observations that included any board 
members with such financial expertise. The data on 
board characteristics comes from BoardEx, a database 
that has information by year on each director for a 
large number of firms around the world.  
Because we are using both publicly traded and 
privately held firms, the performance measures we 
use are accounting (as opposed to market-based) 
variables, including: cash as a portion of total assets, 
leverage (non-current liabilities over total assets), 
ROA (net income over total assets), risk (standard 
deviation of ROA), and a risk-return measure, 
coefficient of variation (standard deviation of ROA 
over mean ROA). As controls, we use firm age 
(natural log of 2012 minus founding date) and size 
(natural log of total assets). The accounting data 
comes from Orbis (one of the Bureau van Dyke 
reporting service databases, related to Osiris and 
Amadeus).  
To construct the data set, we hand-matched firms 
using company name initially and then checking 
industry to ensure the quality of the matches. There 
are many firms included in Orbis that were not 
included in BoardEx, and there were some companies 
listed in BoardEx that we were unable to find in the 
Orbis database. For example, the BoardEx data set 
presented information on 274 French firms, whereas 
Orbis provided accounting data on 16,371 French 
companies. We were able to match Orbis data with 
274 French firms included in BoardEx. Each such 
firm had a number of annual instances of accounting 
information, so following data cleaning, we had a 
total of 2,030 observations with data for both both 
board structure and accounting performance from 
French companies. For more details on the exact 
process used to match the firms, see the appendix, 
which also contains data on the Windsorization 
process. 
Combining all eight countries, we constructed 
11,090 firm-year observations from BoardEx firms 
that were located in Orbis. Our combined dataset 
begins in 2003 (631 observations), and ends in 2012 
(1,078 observations). The year with the most 
observations was 2008 (with 1,112 observations). 
Because we use ratios for our financial variables (the 
only exception being log of total assets as our coarse 
measure of size) and due to the overall monetary 
stability of the currencies we use during this time 
period (e.g., no hyperinflationary periods), inflation 
was not a major concern. 
Table 1 lists the variables and their descriptive 
statistics. Note that most of the accounting variables 
(along with the BoardEx variables for average director 
age and netrwork centrality) were windsorized at the 
5% value to eliminate outliers (for non-Windsorized 
extreme values, see the appendix). Panel A contains 
information on number of observations, mean, 
standard deviation, and minimum and maximum 
values for each variable in the paper.  
Are listed firms substantially different from 
unlisted firms in our data? Panel B provides some 
analysis of this issue. The chart lists mean values for 
both listed and unlisted firms, as well as results of 
two-tailed t-tests and nonparametric median tests. We 
see that several variables have quite different average 
values. Unsurprisingly, unlisted firms are significantly 
smaller, exhibit less leverage, and are riskier (higher 
ROA volatility). Other significant differences might 
not be as obvious: unlisted firms have a higher degree 
of network centrality, and are much less likely to be 
led by an executive chair or CEO. Despite corporate 
governance guidelines that might put more pressure 
on publicly traded firms to incorporate outside 
directors, our data show that it is privately held firms 
that are more likely to have a higher portion of outside 
directors. In addition, unlisted firms tend to have more 
female board members (p-value 6.31%). Director age 
and CFO/FD experience is roughly equivalend 
between the two groups. 
Panel C contains information on the listing status 
of the firms in our study, broken down by country. 
For the majority of firm-year observations that 
overlapped in both Orbis and BoardEx, we were able 
to ascertain whether they were privately held or listed, 
and if so, in which equity market index they were 
included. Firms belong to a “big” index if they are 
listed on the FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX, or Eurotop 
100. We have 1,665 observations in this category. 
Other firms in our dataset are included in MDAX, 
AIM, SBF, TecDAX, etc., accounting for another 
6,886 observations. We have 4,196 observations from 
firms with no stock market listing (per BoardEx). 
Panel D provides information on observations by year 
and listing status. The dataset begins in 2003, but the 
year with the most observations is 2008. 
Panel E indicated the numbers of observations 
by industry group by country. We had the most 
observations for the UK (4,159), but the number of 
observations from other countries more or less mirrors 
the size of their economy. The largest industry 
category is “other services”, with “machinery, 
equipment” in second place. Panel F indicates the 
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number of observations for each year by industry 
group. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Overall Data Set 
 
 Variable Definition Obs. Mean StDev Min Max 
Or
bis
 
Cash* Cash or cash equivalents/ total assets 8,151 0.123 0.114 0.005 0.421 
Leverage* Long-term debt (non-current liabilities)/ total assets 8,151 0.243 0.176 0.003 0.601 
ROA* Net income/ total assets 8,151 0.034 0.079 -0.173 0.178 
Risk* Standard deviation of ROA 11,082 0.066 0.069 0.007 0.268 
Firm Age* Natural log of  (2012 – founding year) / 100 ** 10,953 0.527 0.428 0.060 1.480 
Size* Natural log of total assets 8,151  13.209 2.205 9.402 17.148 
Coefficient of 
Variation* 
Standard deviation of ROA / mean 
ROA  11,072  0.467 2.197 -4.691 6.032 
Vector of 
industry 
dummies 
Take value of “1” for each “BVD 
major sector”(see Panel E) 9,284 -- -- -- -- 
Bo
ard
Ex
 
Centrality* Mean of “Director Network Size” / 100 ** 11,082  2.108 1.535 0.250 5.640 
Chair Indicator taking value of “1” if board chair was exuctive of firm (or CEO) 11,082 0.494 0.500 0 1 
Portion Outside Portion of directors who were outsiders (NED) 11,082 0.335 0.236 0 1 
Portion Male Portion of directors were were male 11,082 0.921 0.132 0 1 
Director Age* Mean age of the directors 11,090 55.490 4.285 47.000 62.667 
CFOFD Number of directors with CFO or FD (Financial Director) experience 11,090 0.292 0.455 0 1 
Big Index 
Indicator taking value of “1” for 
firms listed on “big” 
indices/exchanges 
11,082 0.150 0.357 0 1 
Listed Indicator taking value of “1” for listed firms but not on big indices 11,082 0.471 0.499 0 1 
 
*All Orbis variables (except industry dummies), as well as the BoardEx variables centrality and Director Age 
(of mean board member), were Windsorized, replacing extremes below the 5% and above the 95% values as the 
5% and 95% level, respectively.  See appendix for details of these values.  **Divided by 100 for ease of 
presenting coefficients in results tables. 
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Panel B: Listed/Unlisted Comparison 
 
Variable Unlisted Listed p-value of 2-tailed t-test p-value of median test Mean Obs. Mean Obs. 
Cash 0.125 3,088 0.121 5,063 0.204 0.322 
Leverage 0.238 3,088 0.246 5,063 0.037** 0.107† 
ROA 0.034 3,088 0.034 5,063 0.898 0.241 
Risk 0.069 4,196 0.064 6,886 0.001*** 0.000*** 
Firm Age 0.526 4,149 0.527 6,804 0.926 0.134† 
Size 13.106 3,088 13.272 5,063 0.001*** 0.212 
Coef. of Var. 0.469 4,190 0.466 6,882 0.953 0.000*** 
Centrality 2.169 4,196 2.070 6,886 0.001*** 0.012** 
Exec. Chair 0.449 4,196 0.521 6,886 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Portion Outside 0.369 4,196 0.314 6,886 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Portion Male 0.918 4,196 0.923 6,886 0.0631* N/A (median = 1) 
Director Age 55.448 4,196 55.507 6,886 0.480 0.414 
CFOFD 0.293 4,196 0.291 6,886 0.833 0.850 
 
Note: “listed” sample includes all firms included on both major indices or any index at all (unlike in Panel C or 
in Table 3 where those are broken down as separate categories).  Median test is continuity corrected.  Statistical 
significance indicated by *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
 
Panel C: Observations by Country 
 
Country Observations by Listing Status** Total Obs. Unlisted Index Of which, Big Index 
Belgium 374 144 144 518 
Finland 182 89 59 271 
France 718 1,312 326 2,030 
Germany 380 1,248 312 1,628 
Italy 229 392 17 621 
Netherlands 233 324 64 557 
Spain 189 332 65 521 
UK 1,891 3,045 678 4,936 
Total 4,196 6,886 1,665 11,082 
 
**”Big” indices include FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX, and Eurotop 100; other indices include MDAX, AIM, SBF, 
TecDAX (each of these categories based on the BoardEx variable “Index”).   
 
Panel D: Observations by Year and Listing Status 
 
Year Unlisted Listed Of which, Big Index Total 
2003 251 380 53 631 
2004 276 444 62 720 
2005 330 554 80 884 
2006 362 604 87 966 
2007 395 657 98 1,052 
2008 423 689 117 1,112 
2009 405 682 129 1,087 
2010 435 673 146 1,108 
2011 253 393 153 646 
2012 413 665 159 1,078 
Total 3,543 5,741 1,084 11,082 
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Panel E: Observations by Country and Industry 
 
Industry Belgium Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain UK Total 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 
Chemicals, rubber 65 32 178 202 73 35 60 299 944 
Construction 19 8 58 18 35 25 49 138 350 
Education, Health 11 0 34 9 0 5 0 106 165 
Food, beverages 27 2 91 10 18 44 38 181 411 
Gas, Water, Electricity 7 9 51 79 65 0 67 72 350 
Hotels & restaurants 0 0 40 0 9 0 18 130 197 
Machinery, equipment 90 73 304 408 132 107 29 664 1,807 
Metals & metal products 21 28 40 53 5 17 26 295 485 
Other services 80 4 474 216 51 98 97 872 1,892 
Post & telecomm. 34 10 51 45 26 25 9 121 321 
Primary sector 0 0 79 5 9 20 6 196 315 
Publishing, printing 19 18 26 70 36 52 9 305 535 
Textiles, clothes 10 0 81 30 28 4 6 147 306 
Transport 19 10 45 41 24 7 10 171 327 
Wholesale & retail trade 21 11 147 114 6 29 9 420 757 
Wood, cork, paper 9 41 16 8 0 0 6 35 115 
Total 432 246 1,715 1,308 517 468 439 4,159 9,284 
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Panel F: Observations by Industry and Year 
 
Industry 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Banks 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Chemicals, rubber 65 71 86 95 109 114 113 119 58 114 944 
Construction 27 31 35 37 41 41 40 41 19 38 350 
Education, Health 7 11 12 19 22 24 23 19 10 18 165 
Food, beverages, tobacco 30 34 38 42 44 49 48 50 29 47 411 
Gas, Water, Electricity 23 24 37 37 40 43 44 43 18 41 350 
Hotels & restaurants 16 14 19 22 22 23 23 22 16 20 197 
Machinery, equipment 125 139 172 190 205 215 213 216 127 205 1,807 
Metals & metal products 24 33 47 52 54 59 56 60 39 61 485 
Other services 127 148 184 197 218 230 219 225 126 218 1,892 
Post & telecomm. 24 26 28 31 37 39 37 36 27 36 321 
Primary sector 22 26 28 32 35 39 38 39 18 38 315 
Publishing, printing 41 47 56 58 58 60 59 58 40 58 535 
Textiles, clothes 21 27 33 33 33 33 34 32 26 34 306 
Transport 25 26 30 33 37 38 38 37 26 37 327 
Wholesale & retail trade 47 55 68 76 85 90 87 95 58 96 757 
Wood, cork, paper 7 8 10 11 12 14 14 15 8 16 115 
Total 631 720 884 966 1,052 1,112 1,087 1,108 646 1,078 9,284 
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3.2 Variables and Models 
 
Our initial dependent variables are performance 
measured as cash/assets, capital structure, ROA, and 
risk (standard deviation of ROA). In a set of extended 
models, we also examine the coefficient of variation 
(standard deviation of ROA divided by mean ROA). 
The basic model is as follows: 
 
Pi,t = α + β1SIZEi,t + β2AGEi,t + β3BOARDi,t + β4CONTROLSi,t + εi,t (1) 
 
where P is a measure of firm performance 
(initially, we examine separately cash/assets, capital 
structure measured as long-term debt over total assets, 
risk measured as standard deviation of ROA—in 
subsequent specifications, we examine coefficient of 
variation as the dependent variable). SIZE is 
measured as the natural log of total assets, AGE is 
measured in the natural log of years since the firm 
was founded. BOARD refers to board member 
characteristics (network centrality, portion of outside 
or non-executive directors, age, portion male, 
presence of a financial expert). Finally, CONTROLS 
refers to several control variables used in some (but 
not all) specifications, including some of the 
performance measures (cash, leverage, and ROA). For 
most specifications, we use GLS (random effects) 
with the time dimension t as years and indexed i for 
firm. Generally, we use industry dummies (omitted 
category is “other services”) and country dummies 
(omitted category is UK). In specifications using risk 
(e.g., in Table 2, specifications E, F, and G) or 
coefficient of variation as the dependent variable, we 
use OLS with error terms clustered at the firm level 
(GLS is not appropriate because risk does not vary for 
an individual firm). In robustness tests (below), we 
are forced to omit the vectors of dummy variables 
because we use firm-level fixed effects. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Baseline Model 
 
Table 2 provides the first set of results, the baseline 
models A-G we will employ subsequently. The 
specifications include the full sample. Overall, the 
Wald Chi2 figures are large and highly significant, 
which is not surprising given the sample size. There 
are 8,054 observations per specification, with 1,180 
firms represented, for an average of about eight firm-
year observations per company. The R2 values are 
typical of studies that employ a large amount of firm-
level data from privately held companies (Cole 2013; 
Hall 2012). 
One of the clearest findings from the initial tests 
is the fact that network centrality is closely related to 
cash holdings and level of risk. Firms with more 
connected boards have more cash, lower ROA, but are 
riskier (higher standard deviation of ROA). Director 
age is significant in many specifications-older 
directors are associated with lower levels of cash 
holdings and less risk. This could indicate that older 
directors (presumably with more experience) are more 
able to constrain entrenched CEOs. Later, we will 
consider the role of directors in firms with executive 
chairs (including dual CEOs) vis-à-vis non-executive 
chairs. Surprisingly, the coefficient for the CEO 
variable is positive and significant in the risk 
regressions, counter to expectations that an entrenched 
CEO or executive chair would reduce the riskiness of 
the firm’s decisions. 
In terms of accounting relationships, firm size is 
(unsurprisingly) correlated with leverage-it is well-
documented that larger firms tend to hold more debt 
as a portion of assets. Cash holdings are lower at 
larger firms, perhaps due to lesser need for 
precautionary balances (Schauten, et al 2008; Hall, et 
al 2013). Smaller firms tend to be riskier, which 
reflects the fact that they are likely to have less 
diversified streams of income; generally, larger firms 
with multiple divisions and product lines are likely to 
exhibit less cash flow volatility.  
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Table 2. Baseline Regressions 
 
This table reports regression results with dependent variables as indicated.  Cash is cash/total assets, leverage is 
long-term debt/total assets, ROA is net income/total assets, size is natural log of total assets (all four of which 
are windsorized), firm age is 2012-founding year, centrality is mean network size, dual role is a dummy taking 
the value of “1” when the CEO is also the Chair, Outsiders is portion of outside (NED), male is portion male, 
age is mean age of the members of the board, CFO/FD is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if any 
members of the board had experience as a CEO or financial director.  Sector and country dummies are variables 
taking the value of “1” for BVD sector (with “other services” as the omitted category) or country (Finland, 
France, Germany, with UK as reference category), respectively.  Specifications A-D use random effects 
generalized least squares (firm and year); specifications E-G use OLS with standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. Z-statistics in parentheses for A-E; T-statistics for F-H. 
 
Dependent variable: Cash Leverage ROA Risk 
Specification: A B C D E F G H 
Cash -- -- -- -0.171*** (-12.25) 
0.073*** 
(7.89) -- 
0.055*** 
(3.71) 
0.063*** 
(4.58) 
Leverage -- -0.111*** (-12.68) -- -- 
-0.103*** 
(-14.31) -- 
0.010 
(0.87) 
-0.010 
(-0.95) 
ROA -- 0.112*** (8.57) -- 
-0.238*** 
(-14.67) -- -- -- 
-0.233*** 
(-12.83) 
FirmAge 0.008 (1.17) 
0.006 
(1.05) 
-0.009 
(-1.08) 
-0.008 
(-0.93) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
Size -0.023*** (-16.89) 
-0.019*** 
(-13.98) 
0.040*** 
(22.42) 
0.038*** 
(21.95) 
0.014*** 
(13.96) 
-0.015*** 
(-11.58) 
-0.014*** 
(-10.14) 
-0.011*** 
(-8.73) 
Centrality 0.003*** (2.72) 
0.004*** 
(3.23) 
0.000 
(-0.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.004*** 
(-4.38) 
0.009*** 
(6.19) 
0.008*** 
(5.86) 
0.007*** 
(5.24) 
Exec. Chair / Dual 
CEO 
-0.002 
(-0.51) 
-0.001 
(-0.35) 
0.002 
(0.52) 
0.001 
(0.30) 
-0.002 
(-0.77) 
0.006* 
(1.72) 
0.007* 
(1.75) 
0.006* 
(1.82) 
Outsiders 0.011 (1.52) 
0.012† 
(1.48) 
-0.005 
(-0.45) 
-0.005 
(-0.48) 
-0.007 
(-1.03) 
0.011 
(1.02) 
0.010 
(0.91) 
0.009 
(0.97) 
Male -0.005 (-0.52) 
-0.008 
(-0.89) 
-0.013 
(-1.13) 
-0.008 
(-0.74) 
0.014* 
(1.81) 
0.009 
(0.86) 
0.009 
(0.86) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
Director Age -0.001*** (-3.66) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.7) 
0.000 
(-0.66) 
-0.001 
(-1.37) 
0.000 
(-0.92) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.0) 
CFO/FD 0.001 (0.43) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
-0.005 
(-1.34) 
-0.005 
(-1.41) 
0.000 
(-0.10) 
-0.009** 
(-2.16) 
-0.009** 
(-2.16) 
-0.007* 
(-1.81) 
Intercept 0.457*** (18.12) 
0.432*** 
(17.56) 
-0.235*** 
(-7,17) 
-0.174*** 
(-5.41) 
-0.116*** 
(-5.94) 
0.309*** 
(11.01) 
0.290*** 
(10.03) 
0.272*** 
(10.27) 
         
Observations 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 
Firms 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 
Wald chi2/F-stat 421.41*** (0.000) 
730.04*** 
(0.000) 
873.20*** 
(0.000) 
1,396.70*** 
(0.000) 
436.21*** 
(0.000) 
12.99*** 
(0.000) 
12.70*** 
(0.000) 
18.58*** 
(0.000) 
R2 (Between) 14.03% 20.70% 37.67% 43.73% 8.02% 26.98% 27.61% 33.89% 
 
Levels of significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
 
4.2 Listing Status 
 
Table 3 presents results of our hypothesis that listing 
status affects the relationship between board 
characteristics and financial outcomes. Panel A 
presents results from re-running the regressions from 
Table 2, but with the addition of two dummy variables 
to reflect listing status (“big” if the firm is included in 
a large5 index, and “listed” if the firms is listed but not 
included on large indices). As noted above, we would 
expect firms included in the more prestigious indices 
to receive more press attention, and potentially, suffer 
                                                        
5 The “big” indices are FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX, or Eurotop 
100. 
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more scrutiny concerning their corporate governance. 
Most of the relationships from Table 2 hold in the 
new specifications. Firms listed on the bigger indices 
hold less cash, have less leverage vis-à-vis privately 
held companies. Firms included in the other indices 
are more similar to unlisted companies, and few 
significant differences exist, although ROA was on 
average lower for listed companies compared to 
unlisted ones.  
 
 
Table 3. Listing Status Results 
 
This table reports regression results with dependent variable as indicated.  Unreported variables are included as in Table 2, 
for specifications A-H.  Cash is cash/total assets, leverage is long-term debt/total assets, ROA is net income/total assets, size 
is natural log of total assets (all four of which are windsorized), firm age is 2012-founding year, centrality is mean network 
size, dual role is a dummy taking the value of “1” when the CEO is also the chair or if the chair has executive role. Outsiders 
is portion of outside (NED) directors, male is portion male, age is mean age of the members of the board, CFO/FD is a 
dummy variable taking the value of “1” if any members of the board had experience as a CEO or financial director.  Sector 
and country dummies are variables taking the value of “1” for BVD sector (with “other services” as the omitted category) or 
country (with UK as reference category), respectively.  Specifications follow Table 2 (GLS with random effects for A-E; 
OLS with firm-clustered error terms for F-H).  Z-statistics in parentheses for A-E; T-statistics for F-H. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
Dependent variable: Cash Leverage ROA Risk 
Specification: A B C D E F G H 
Cash -- -- -- -0.172*** (-12.31) 
0.073*** 
(7.91) -- 
0.054*** 
(3.69) 
0.063*** 
(4.57) 
Leverage -- -0.111*** (-12.74) -- -- 
-0.103*** 
(-14.27) -- 
0.009 
(0.85) 
-0.010 
(-0.96) 
ROA -- 0.112*** (8.59) -- 
-0.238*** 
(-14.65) -- -- -- 
-0.233*** 
(-12.81) 
FirmAge 0.008 (1.16) 
0.006 
(1.03) 
-0.010 
(-1.08) 
-0.008 
(-0.93) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
Size -0.023*** (-16.89) 
-0.019*** 
(-13.97) 
0.040*** 
(22.42) 
0.038*** 
(21.94) 
0.014*** 
(13.96) 
-0.015*** 
(-11.55) 
-0.014 
(-10.11) 
-0.011*** 
(-8.71) 
Big Index -0.013*** (-2.83) 
-0.014*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.009† 
(-1.56) 
-0.011** 
(-1.98) 
0.002 
(0.65) 
-0.005 
(-1.08) 
-0.005 
(-0.98) 
-0.003 
(-0.70) 
Listed -0.001 (-0.36) 
0.000 
(-0.17) 
0.000 
(0.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.004** 
(-1.97) 
-0.002 
(-0.72) 
-0.002 
(-0.70) 
-0.003 
(-0.98) 
Centrality 0.003*** (2.70) 
0.004*** 
(3.21) 
0.000 
(-0.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.004*** 
(-4.38) 
0.009*** 
(6.13) 
0.008*** 
(5.80) 
0.007*** 
(5.20) 
Exec. Chair / Dual CEO -0.001 (-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
0.002 
(0.52) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
0.006* 
(1.73) 
0.007* 
(1.76) 
0.006* 
(1.83) 
Outsiders 0.012 (1.37) 
0.013† 
(1.49) 
-0.005 
(-0.44) 
-0.005 
(-0.47) 
-0.007 
(-1.10) 
0.011 
(1.00) 
0.009 
(0.90) 
0.009 
(0.93) 
Male -0.004 (-0.50) 
-0.008 
(-0.86) 
-0.013 
(-1.11) 
-0.008 
(-0.72) 
0.013* 
(1.73) 
0.009 
(0.85) 
0.009 
(0.85) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
Director Age -0.001*** (-3.64) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.66) 
0.000 
(-0.64) 
-0.001 
(-1.35) 
0.000 
(-0.93) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.99) 
CFO/FD 0.001 (0.48) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
-0.005 
(-1.30) 
-0.005 
(-1.35) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.12) 
-0.009** 
(-2.12) 
-0.007* 
(-1.76) 
Observations 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 8,054 
Firms 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 
R2 (Between) 13.95% 20.65% 37.75% 43.81% 8.31% 27.04% 27.66% 33.93% 
 
Levels of significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
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Panel B:Firms Listed on Major Indices 
 
 Dependent variable Cash Leverage ROA Risk 
Specification: A B C D E F G H 
Centrality 0.010*** (3.21) 
0.011*** 
(3.42) 
-0.003 
(-0.73) 
-0.003 
(-0.73) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.63) 
0.010*** 
(2.66) 
0.010*** 
(2.73) 
0.008** 
(2.36) 
Exec. Chair / Dual 
CEO 
0.002 
(0.26) 
0.003 
(0.43) 
0.004 
(0.37) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.008 
(-1.35) 
0.024*** 
(2.86) 
0.024*** 
(2.90) 
0.021*** 
(2.78) 
Outsiders 0.022 (1.08) 
0.013 
(0.67) 
-0.048* 
(-1.78) 
-0.036 
(-1.38) 
0.019 
(1.24) 
-0.023 
(-1.16) 
-0.020 
(-1.06) 
-0.016 
(-0.88) 
Male -0.040* (-1.83) 
-0.043** 
(-2.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.08) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.010 
(0.54) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
-0.005 
(-0.21) 
-0.014 
(-0.62) 
Director Age -0.002* (-1.88) 
-0.002** 
(-2.02) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.59) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.001 
(-1.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.70) 
-0.001 
(-0.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
CFO/FD -0.012* (-1.69) 
-0.011† 
(-1.61) 
-0.005 
(-0.51) 
-0.009 
(-1.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.87) 
-0.003 
(-0.42) 
-0.003 
(-0.41) 
-0.003 
(-0.39) 
Observations 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 
Firms 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R2 (Between) 27.81% 32.06% 46.40% 51.53% 17.67% 34.74% 35.35% 40.15% 
Levels of significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
 
Panel C: Firms Listed on Other Indices 
 
 Dependent variable Cash Leverage ROA Risk 
Specification: A B C D E F G H 
         
Centrality 0.004** (2.20) 
0.005** 
(2.53) 
0.000 
(-0.20) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
-0.005*** 
(-3.39) 
0.009*** 
(4.98) 
0.008*** 
(4.60) 
0.007*** 
(4.01) 
Exec. Chair / Dual 
CEO 
-0.003 
(-0.75) 
-0.004 
(-0.89) 
-0.008 
(-1.41) 
-0.009† 
(-1.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
0.005 
(0.99) 
0.005 
(0.96) 
0.005 
(1.04) 
Outsiders -0.011 (-0.86) 
-0.004 
(-0.35) 
0.040** 
(2.40) 
0.033** 
(2.01) 
-0.012 
(-1.16) 
0.005 
(0.34) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
0.004 
(0.29) 
Male -0.003 (-0.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.25) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
-0.003 
(-0.20) 
0.003 
(0.29) 
0.006 
(0.42) 
0.005 
(0.34) 
0.003 
(0.19) 
Director Age -0.001* (-1.88) 
-0.001** 
(-2.19) 
0.000 
(-0.35) 
0.000 
(-0.19) 
0.001*** 
(2.62) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.79) 
CFO/FD 0.006 (1.32) 
0.005 
(1.08) 
-0.007 
(-1.12) 
-0.005 
(-0.78) 
0.007* 
(1.75) 
-0.013** 
(-2.29) 
-0.013** 
(-2.34) 
-0.009* 
(-1.72) 
         
Observations 3,784 3,784 3,784 3,784 3,784 3,784 3,784 3,784 
Firms 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 
R2 (Between) 12.91% 18.95% 36.99% 41.91% 8.42% 30.71% 31.81% 37.28% 
Levels of significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
 
In Panels B-D, we perform analysis on sub-
samples split by listing status (big indices, other 
listed, unlisted). Network centrality is positively 
related to cash holdings for all three groups of firms; 
centrality also is related to more risk-taking among all 
three categories. As before, these findings are 
consistent with the idea that better connected boards 
are constraining CEO entrenchment by encouraging 
less cash and more risk. 
The role of outside board members seems to 
change between unlisted firms and those included on 
smaller indices. Panels C and D indicate that a higher 
portion of outside board members (NEDs) is 
positively related to leverage for firms listed but 
included on smaller indices, yet for unlisted firms, 
more NEDs are associated with less leverage. This 
could indicate that when a firm is publicly traded, but 
under less public scrutiny than firms listed on a 
prestigious index, NEDs are effective in constaining 
entrenchment.  
The negative relationship between director age 
and leverage noted above seems to be driven mainly 
by bigger firms (listed in large indices); conversely, 
older directors seem to mitigate risk-taking by 
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companies listed on smaller indices (but not unlisted 
firms).  The leadership variable (executive chair or 
CEO as chair) is significantly related to risk for large 
firms, but not for unlisted firms or firms listed on 
smaller indices.  
How do these findings relate to expectations of 
entrenchment? Entrenchment is generally associated 
with high levels of cash, low leverage, and low risk. 
For all three listing categories (big, listed, unlisted), 
greater network centrality limits neither cash holdings 
nor leverage, and is positively associated with risk-
taking. Older directors seem to have a negative impact 
on cash holdings (for all three groups) and do not 
encourage leverage (all three groups), but do not 
encourage risk either. Despite the fact that female 
directors have been found in the past to be less risk 
averse, where we have any significant relationship 
(unlisted firms), it appears that more male directors 
are associated with less volatile profitability. CFO/FD 
experience on the board is associated with less risk, 
but only for firms listed on smaller exchanges. 
In Panel E, we consider more closely the 
relationship between non-executive director 
participation on the board and the firm’s leverage. 
Generally, entrenched managers would be expected to 
encourage lower leverage, ceteris paribus. We split 
the sample into two groups, based on whether 
leverage (non-current liabilities as a portion of total 
assets) is either below the median or above the 
median.6 In the first set of specifications, we use the 
full sample, and see that, irrespective of whether we 
use an extra control (risk-adjusted return), the impact 
of outside directors differs between the low-leverage 
and high-leverage sub-samples. For firms with debt-
heavy capital structure, outside directors tend to 
actually decrease leverage. For firms with little debt, 
there is no significant relationship between leverage 
and the portion of outside directors on the board. This 
evidence does not support the traditional argument 
that outside directors limit entrenchment by, for 
example, encouraging more leverage. 
Because the findings concerning the relationship 
between outside directors and leverage were different 
among Panels B, C, and D, we perform an additional 
set of regressions, again with the sample split between 
the high-leverage (above the median) and low-
leverage (below the median) observations. Results of 
these models are presented in the four rightmost 
columns of Panel E. Because large firms7 tend to have 
                                                        
6 The median was 22.58%; we end up with 4,075 
observations above and 4,076 observations below—of which, 
4,028 and 4,026 were usable in terms of having complete 
data, and are reported in the table. 7 In Panel B of Table 3 the sample is firms listed on blue chip 
indices, whereas in Panel E we group all large firms together 
(irrespective of listing status). This is because the number of 
more leverage, it is expected that the number of low-
leverage observations would be fewer than for high-
leverage observations, and this is the case as revealed 
at the bottom of the table (82 vs. 694 observations, 
respectively). The effect of size on leverage is 
different among the two sub-samples, with the larger 
sample showing a positive effect of size on leverage, 
whereas in the smaller group (which is the top 10% 
largest firms), size is associated with smaller amounts 
of leverage. This is indicative of a U-shaped 
relationship between size and leverage. There are two 
other notable difference between the two sub-samples: 
more male directors are associated with higher debt 
levels for very large firms (but not for the bottom 
90%), and CFO/FD experience on the board is 
associated with more leverage for the bottom 90%, 
but not for the top 10% biggest firms. So, for most of 
the sample, it seems that more male directors as well 
as CFO/FD experience on the board is consistent with 
limitations on managerial entrenchment. 
 
4.3 Dual vs. Split CEO/Chair Structure 
 
Many corporate governance reform recommendations 
involve splitting executive responsibilities (most 
clearly, in the case of the CEO) from the board of 
directors, and this bears further consideration in our 
paper. Ideally, we would consider how the dual nature 
of certain firms affects their risk-weighted (market) 
returns in a traditional setting. But because our study 
encompasses privately held firms, we are unable to 
consider risk-weighted returns as operationalized in 
traditional asset pricing models (CAPM, arbitrage 
pricing theory, or three factor models that include 
book to market value).  
Nevertheless, we can utilize stand-alone risk 
rather than beta (or other factors) as our proxy for 
risk, and therefore now turn to a dependent variable 
we term the coefficient of variation in ROA (defined 
as the standard deviation of ROA divided by the mean 
value of ROA for that firm). In Table 4, we present 
results of just such an exercise. Because the 
coefficient of variation describes the level of risk 
associated with a given return, independent variables 
with a negative coefficient are associated with 
“better” or more desirable performance from the 
perspective of a risk-averse investor; conversely, 
positive coefficients represent independent variables 
for which higher values reduce investor utility (i.e., 
lead to lower returns per unit of risk, or more risk per 
unit of return).  
                                                                                    
observations (1,221) for the firms in Panel B is insufficient to 
allow for splitting the sample between high and low leverage. 
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Table 4. Listing Status Results, Continued 
 
Panel D: Privately Held Firms 
 Dependent variable Cash Leverage ROA Risk 
Specification: A B C D E F G H 
Centrality 0.004* (1.67) 
0.004** 
(2.02) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.000 
(-0.12) 
-0.004** 
(-2.24) 
0.008*** 
(3.68) 
0.008*** 
(3.48) 
0.007*** 
(3.36) 
Exec. Chair / 
Dual CEO 
0.001 
(0.29) 
0.002 
(0.51) 
0.008 
(1.30) 
0.009† 
(1.45) 
0.002 
(0.50) 
0.003 
(0.50) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
0.004 
(0.66) 
Outsiders 0.045*** (3.27) 
0.038*** 
(2.88) 
-0.050*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.041** 
(-2.49) 
-0.016† 
(-1.49) 
0.039** 
(2.40) 
0.038** 
(2.30) 
0.033** 
(2.21) 
Male 0.005 (0.31) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
-0.015 
(-0.79) 
-0.005 
(-0.25) 
0.023* 
(1.79) 
0.029* 
(1.91) 
0.031** 
(2.02) 
0.025* 
(1.76) 
Director Age -0.001** (-2.02) 
-0.001* 
(-1.83) 
0.000 
(-0.47) 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.001 
(-1.32) 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
-0.001* 
(-1.79) 
CFO/FD 0.002 (0.48) 
0.002 
(0.50) 
-0.006 
(-0.98) 
-0.006 
(-1.05) 
-0.005 
(-1.31) 
-0.006 
(-1.03) 
-0.007 
(-1.16) 
-0.008 
(-1.36) 
Observations 3,049 3,049 3,049 3,049 3,049 3,049 3,049 3,049 
Firms 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 
R2 (Between) 15.39% 23.56% 36.13% 43.66% 10.31% 26.41% 27.35% 33.68% 
Levels of significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
 
Panel E: Debt Levels and Effect of Outside Directors on Performance 
Dependent variable is leverage (non-current liabilities over total assets).  Cash is cash/total assets, leverage is long-term debt/total 
assets, ROA is net income/total assets, size is natural log of total assets (all four of which are windsorized), firm age is 2012-
founding year, centrality is mean network size, dual role is a dummy taking the value of “1” when the CEO is also the Chair, 
Outsiders is portion of outside (NED), male is portion male, age is mean age of the members of the board, CFO/FD is a dummy 
variable taking the value of “1” if any members of the board had experience as a CEO or financial director. Sector and country 
dummies are variables taking the value of “1” for BVD sector (with “other services” as the omitted category) or country (with UK 
as reference category), respectively.  All specifications use generalized least squares (firm and year); Z-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 Full Sample Biggest Firms Only (Top 10% of assets) 
Debt level is: Below median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Cash -0.111*** (-13.24) 
-0.035† 
(-1.52) 
-0.111*** 
(-13.24) 
-0.035† 
(-1.52) 
-0.099 
(-1.07) 
-0.067 
(-1.00) 
-0.134† 
(-1.49) 
-0.065 
(-0.98) 
Coefficient of 
Variation -- -- 
-0.001 
(-1.17) 
0.000 
(-0.29) -- -- 
0.018** 
(2.45) 
-0.006 
(-0.88) 
Firm Age -0.003 (-0.59) 
-0.011 
(-1.33) 
-0.003 
(-0.64) 
-0.011 
(-1.32) 
-0.019 
(-0.77) 
-0.002 
(-0.09) 
-0.026 
(-1.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
Size 0.015*** (13.84) 
0.010*** 
(4.93) 
0.015*** 
(13.89) 
0.010*** 
(4.91) 
-0.057* 
(-1.83) 
0.049*** 
(2.92) 
-0.067** 
(-2.20) 
0.050*** 
(2.96) 
Centrality -0.003*** (-2.83) 
0.003† 
(1.49) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.83) 
0.003† 
(1.48) 
0.012† 
(1.62) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
0.008 
(1.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
Exec. Chair / 
Dual CEO 
0.003 
(1.19) 
0.005 
(1.11) 
0.003 
(1.20) 
0.005 
(1.12) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
0.012 
(1.24) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.012 
(1.28) 
Outsiders 0.004 (0.60) 
-0.025* 
(-1.94) 
0.004 
(0.58) 
-0.025* 
(-1.95) 
-0.068 
(-0.95) 
-0.037 
(-1.08) 
-0.015 
(-0.21) 
-0.038 
(-1.10) 
Male -0.001 (-0.15) 
-0.024* 
(-1.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.024* 
(-1.67) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.105*** 
(3.18) 
-0.119 
(-1.06) 
0.105*** 
(3.20) 
Director Age 0.000 (-0.51) 
-0.001 
(-1.12) 
0.000 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-1.10) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
0.005 
(1.10) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
CFO/FD 0.003 (1.07) 
-0.011** 
(-2.49) 
0.003 
(1.08) 
-0.011** 
(-2.49) 
0.055*** 
(2.89) 
-0.006 
(-0.69) 
0.039** 
(2.03) 
-0.007 
(-0.74) 
Observations 4,028 4,026 4,028 4,026 82 694 82 694 
Firms 834 803 834 803 24 113 24 113 
Between R2 34.77% 14.36% 34.85% 14.38% 70.15% 38.02% 75.06% 38.60% 
 
Levels of significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
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The first panel of Table 4 contains very cursory 
information on a specification we ran that replicates 
the independent variables included in model G of 
Table 2, but uses as the dependent variable coefficient 
of variation. Again, there is no significant relationship 
from executive participation on the board of directors 
(although size, network centrality, and director age 
have positive, negative, and positive relationships, 
respectively with risk-adjusted return).  
We investigate this finding further in Panel B, 
where we replicate that specification but divide the 
sample into the three listing categories as well as the 
dual or split CEO role. There are some notable 
differences. First, we see that firms listed on big 
indices with a non-executive chair (NEC), more cash 
is associated with a higher coefficient of variation - 
this is consistent with entrenchment. More size is 
associated with a higher coefficient of variation in 
almost every specification. In addition, older directors 
are associated with worse performance in almost 
every specification, and in five models, significantly 
so.  
The role of outside board members is interesting. 
For firms listed on large indices with non-executive 
chairs, more outsiders are associated with worse 
performance (higher coefficient of variation), but for 
firms with executive chairs (including dual 
CEO/chair) which are listed on other indices, NED 
prevalence has a positive relationship with risk-
adjusted returns (indicated by the negative 
coefficient). The full sample results are clearer in 
interpretation, in that for firms with an executive 
chair, more NEDs are associated with better risk-
adjusted returns.  
 
4.4 Country-Level Variation 
 
We now turn to country-level results, based on the 
findings of Goergen (2007) and de Jong, et al (2002) 
that the mechanisms of corporate governance work 
differently in different countries. In addition, we are 
able to address the thesis that various mechanisms of 
incentive alignment are complementary, such that 
where the market for corporate control is robust 
(Martynova and Renneboog 2011), there is less need 
for boards to exhibit anti-entrenchment 
characteristics.  
Given the common viewpoint that corporate 
governance and market conditions in the UK are 
substantially different from continental Europe, and 
that we conveniently have about half of our 
observations from each, we split the sample into UK 
observations and on-UK observations. We consider 
several dependent variables, indicated at the top of 
each column in Table 5. 
There are some differences. Outside the UK, 
older firms tend to hold more cash (more consistent 
with entrenchment), whereas in the UK, younger 
directors tend to be associated with less cash. Director 
network centrality has no relationship with cash in 
continental Europe, but is associated with more cash 
for the UK. Male directors are associated with lower 
leverage in the UK, but not on the mainland. Younger 
directors are associated with less leverage outside the 
UK, but not inside it. The findings for ROA are 
remarkably similar for both institutional settings (with 
almost identical signs, significance levels and even 
coefficient magnitudes for cash, leverage, size, and 
centrality), but more male directors and older 
directors are associated with higher ROA outside the 
UK (and not within it). Finally, although the findings 
for coefficient of variation are fairly similar in the two 
different zones, older directors are associated with 
worse performance (positive coefficient) in the UK, 
but not on the mainland. 
It is difficult to discern a common pattern from 
the country results. One consistent theme, in fact, is 
that the relationships are fairly similar among 
accounting and governance variables in the two areas. 
Areas of difference are either not very substantial, or 
when they occur, are not highly persuasive in terms of 
indicating meaningful differences in governance 
between the UK and non-UK setting.  
 
5. Robustness 
 
To determine whether our results are robust, we 
revisit the models presented in Tables 2 – 5, but 
instead of using firm and country level dummy 
variables, we opt for specifications including firm-
level fixed effects. For ease of presentation, we do not 
reproduce the results in this paper. We find few 
substantial differences between the findings presented 
here and those of the fixed effects models.8
                                                        
8 Results are available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 5. Leadership Regressions 
 
Panel A: Dual Role and Coefficient of Variation 
 
Here, we replicate model G from Table 2, but use as the dependent variable the coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation of ROA divided by mean ROA across sample period).  T-statistics in parentheses: 
 
Coefficient for ExecChair / Dual CEO: 0.123 (0.92) 
Other significant variables:  
Size: 0.191*** (4.14)  Centrality: -0.078† (-1.60)  DirectorAge: 0.034* (2.17) 
 
Panel B: Split Sample 
 
This table reports regression results with dependent variable coefficient of variation (standard deviation of ROA 
divided by mean ROA).  Sample is split based on whether chair has executive authority (including CEO) or not.  
Cash is cash/total assets, leverage is long-term debt/total assets, ROA is net income/total assets, size is natural 
log of total assets (all four of which are windsorized), firm age is 2012-founding year, centrality is mean 
network size, dual role is a dummy taking the value of “1” when the CEO is also the Chair, Outsiders is portion 
of outside (NED), male is portion male, age is mean age of the members of the board, CFO/FD is a dummy 
variable taking the value of “1” if any members of the board had experience as a CEO or financial director.  
Sector and country dummies are variables taking the value of “1” for BVD sector (with “other services” as the 
omitted category) or country (with UK as reference category), respectively.  All specifications use OLS with 
standard errors clustered by firm.   
 
Executive / 
Non-Executive 
Chair 
Big Index Other Index Unlisted Full Sample 
ExChr NEC ExChr NEC ExChr NEC ExChr NEC 
Cash -0.424 (-0.21) 
2.176* 
(1.77) 
-0.769 
(-0.70) 
-0.887 
(-0.90) 
-0.438 
(-0.40) 
-0.598 
(-0.59) 
-0.641 
(-0.8) 
-0.063 
(-0.09) 
Leverage -0.495 (-0.60) 
0.669 
(0.71) 
0.231 
(0.34) 
-0.426 
(-0.64) 
1.885*** 
(2.59) 
-1.398† 
(-1.51) 
0.789† 
(1.56) 
-0.556 
(-1.06) 
FirmAge -0.303 (-0.83) 
-0.785* 
(-1.82) 
0.187 
(0.77) 
-0.240 
(-0.77) 
-0.037 
(-0.14) 
-0.076 
(-0.23) 
0.072 
(0.38) 
-0.240 
(-1.06) 
Size 0.454*** (4.46) 
0.251 
(1.30) 
0.253*** 
(3.04) 
0.160* 
(1.95) 
0.081 
(0.83) 
0.238*** 
(2.45) 
0.203*** 
(3.26) 
0.182*** 
(2.87) 
Centrality -0.221** (-2.01) 
-0.171 
(-1.06) 
-0.085 
(-0.95) 
-0.013 
(-0.14) 
-0.161 
(-1.38) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.141** 
(-2.01) 
-0.032 
(-0.50) 
Outsiders 0.543 (0.85) 
1.724*** 
(2.36) 
-1.553** 
(-2.21) 
-0.224 
(-0.31) 
-0.420 
(-0.71) 
-0.370 
(-0.51) 
-0.827* 
(-1.77) 
0.139 
(0.27) 
Male 1.426 (1.24) 
-0.979 
(-0.98) 
0.838 
(1.11) 
0.084 
(0.13) 
-0.094 
(-0.14) 
-0.437 
(-0.57) 
0.532 
(1.06) 
-0.221 
(-0.45) 
Age 0.084** (2.49) 
0.075* 
(1.67) 
0.024 
(0.90) 
0.073** 
(2.31) 
0.026 
(0.91) 
-0.006 
(-0.19) 
0.034* 
(1.75) 
0.035† 
(1.55) 
CFO/FD -0.256 (-0.76 
-0.132 
(-0.46) 
0.217 
(0.80) 
0.011 
(0.04) 
-0.136 
(-0.54) 
0.099 
(0.36) 
0.028 
(0.15) 
-0.004 
(-0.02) 
Observations 573 648 1,915 1,869 1,308 1,741 3,796 4,258 
Firms 126 144 434 440 343 444 688 756 
R2 37.64% 25.79% 9,94% 10.12% 11.70% 8.42% 6.71% 6.30% 
 
Levels of significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
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Table 6. Country Results 
 
This table reports regression results with dependent variables indicated.  Cash is cash/total assets, leverage is 
long-term debt/total assets, ROA is net income/total assets, size is natural log of total assets (all four of which 
are windsorized), firm age is 2012-founding year, centrality is mean network size, dual role is a dummy taking 
the value of “1” when the CEO is also the Chair, Outsiders is portion of outside (NED), male is portion male, 
age is mean age of the members of the board, CFO/FD is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if any 
members of the board had experience as a CEO or financial director.  Sector dummies are variables taking the 
value of “1” for BVD sector (with “other services” as the omitted category).  All specifications except 
coefficient of variation use generalized least squares (firm and year); Z-statistics in parentheses.  For 
specifications with coefficient of variation as the dependent variable, OLS with errors clustered at firm level is 
used. 
 
 Non-UK UK 
Dependent variable  Cash Leverage ROA Coeff. Variation Cash Leverage ROA Coeff. Variation 
Cash -- -0.203*** (-9.53) 
0.088*** 
(7.09) 
-0.435 
(-0.53) -- 
-0.191*** 
(-9.98) 
0.067*** 
(4.86) 
-0.121 
(-0.16) 
Leverage -- -- -0.101*** (-11.62) 
0.236 
(0.47) -- -- 
-0.107*** 
(-9.14) 
-0.070 
(-0.12) 
FirmAge 0.013* (1.83) 
-0.016† 
(-1.62) 
0.005 
(1.19) 
0.124 
(0.69) 
-0.005 
(-0.39) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.005 
(-0.65) 
-0.392 
(-1.29) 
Size -0.015*** (-8.45) 
0.036*** 
(14.54) 
0.009*** 
(7.68) 
0.141** 
(2.22) 
-0.028*** 
(-13.44) 
0.035*** 
(14.09) 
0.018*** 
(11.29) 
0.190*** 
(2.69) 
Centrality -0.001 (-0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.67) 
-0.005*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.092 
(-1.34) 
0.005*** 
(2.95) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.058 
(-0.86) 
Exec. Chair / Dual CEO -0.002 (-0.64) 
0.002 
(0.49) 
-0.004 
(-1.33) 
0.007 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
0.153 
(0.73) 
Outsiders 0.004 (0.46) 
-0.020† 
(-1.47) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
-0.217 
(-0.58) 
0.015 
(1.09) 
0.006 
(0.38) 
-0.013 
(-1.23) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
Male 0.010 (0.99) 
0.021 
(1.43) 
0.020** 
(2.29) 
0.000 
(1.00) 
-0.020 
(-1.35) 
-0.048*** 
(-2.75) 
0.005 
(0.42) 
0.302 
(0.48) 
Age 0.000 (0.55) 
-0.001** 
(-2.32) 
-0.001* 
(-1.69) 
0.025 
(1.24) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.26) 
0.000 
(0.52) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.044* 
(1.74) 
CFO/FD -0.005 (-1.32) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.003 
(-0.76) 
0.172 
(1.01) 
0.008* 
(1.65) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.074 
(-0.34) 
Obs. 4,341 4,341 4,341 4,341 3,713 3,713 3,713 3,713 
Firms 670 670 670 670 510 510 510 510 
(Between) R2 11.53% 35.36% 7.39% 3.24% 13.48% 44.40% 14.10% 6.74% 
 
Levels of significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, † 15%. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Using a unique dataset composed of information from 
both publicly traded and privately held firms, we 
examined the relationship between governance 
characteristics and accounting results. Our results are 
broadly consistent with the view that entrenchment is 
no more likely in one or the other type of firm, and 
that director centrality is actually associated with 
more rather than less entrenchment. These findings 
are consistent with the view that well-ensconced 
CEOs are able to pack the board with directors that 
have a lot of connections, but do not provide 
substantial oversight to decision-making at such 
companies. There were few consistent or obvious 
relationships with entrenchment associated with either 
outsider portion, male participation, director age, or 
CFO/FD experience on the board. In addition, we did 
not find that executive participation on the board 
(either by a CEO or executive chair) was clearly 
associated with entrenchment or poor performance. 
Finally, we found little evidence that country-level 
variation was associated with different relationships 
among governance characteristics and accounting 
outcomes. 
Clearly, more research into the underlying 
mechanisms of corporate governance at privately held 
firms-and how they differ from or resemble 
mechanisms for publicly traded companies—needs to 
be undertaken, and in various institutional settings. 
We hope that this paper makes an initial contribution 
to such understanding by providing evidence on the 
relationships between various governance and board 
characteristics vis-à-vis financial outcomes. 
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Appendix: Data Matching Details 
 
We began with two different data sets, BoardEx and Orbis.  The latter has a much larger number of 
observations.  For example, of French observations, BoardEx contains 296 firms, whereas Orbis contained 
16,371.  Our process of matching then began with identifying firms in BoardEx, and then matching them to 
firms in Orbis.  For each firm in the BoardEx database, we attempted to identify its corresponding match in the 
Orbis file, based on firm name and location.  It was necessary to do this manually, because small discrepancies 
in firm name existed among the different data bases, so an exact match would have substantially reduced the 
number of observations.  To provide an example, there was a firm listed in the BoardEx dataset with name 
“COMPAGNIE DES ALPES SA (CDA)” which we matched with observations in the Orbis database containing 
the firm name “COMPAGNIE DES ALPES S.A.”.  Next, we removed observations of firms that had been 
matched by name but had a different country code in the BoardEx database (perhaps due to a coding error or a 
firm that moved its location over time).  This reduced the number of BoardEx firm-year obsevations from 
11,139 to 11,089.   
Next, we matched each BoardEx firm-year observation to its corresponding Orbis firm-year observation.  
We checked Orbis data for firm founding date, and omitted missing data, leading to a reduction of observations 
from 11,089 to 10,961.  More truncation was necessary due the fact that (1) some firm-year observations in 
Orbis had no data for cash, leverage, net income, ROA, and size; (2) even when matches on firm name and year 
could be found, it was not always possible to find an observation for a given firm in every year in both Orbis 
and BoardEx.  For example, the Orbis data available to us had no observations prior to 2003, even though 
BoardEx data extended back (in some limited cases) to 1999.  So all of the BoardEx firm-year observations with 
an annual report date prior to 2003 were omitted from our analysis.  This final data set had a total of 11,082 
observations, and was the basis for the Windsorization process described, such that all observations below the 
5% level were replaced with the value of the 5% observation, and likewise for the 95% level.  This was done for 
the accounting variables including: size, ROA, cash, leverage, risk, and coefficient of variation.  Descriptive 
statistics from the resulting data set are reported in Table 1.  In the Appendix Table A, below, we report the 
extreme values of the variables prior to Windsorization, and their values following the procedure. 
 
Appendix Table A: Windsorization Values 
 
Variable Lowest value prior to Windsorization 
Windsorized 
value (5%) 
Highest value prior 
to Windsorization 
Windsorized 
value (95%) 
Size  
(natural log of total assets) .8292197 9.402117 19.37619 17.14771 
ROA  
(net income /total assets) -379.4997 -.1728669 74.05649 .1783594 
Cash  
(cash / total assets) 0 .0046025 1 .4214128 
Risk  
(standard deviation of ROA) 0 .0068561 134.0117 .2683391 
Leverage  
(non-current liabilities / total 
assets) 
-.123158 .003244 77.00008 .6009482 
Coefficient of variation  
(standard deviation of ROA / 
mean ROA) 
-822.3452 -4.691017 148.5279 6.032218 
Firm Age  
(2012 – founding year) 1 6 363 148 
Director Age 
(mean age of all directors) 34 47 73 62.66667 
Centrality 
(total board connections / 
number of directors) ; divided 
by 100 to ease presentation of 
coefficients in results tables 
0.66667 25 (becomes 0.25) 2310.758 
564 (becomes 
5.64) 
 
